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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
RICHARD W. RINGWOOD, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
FOREIGN AUTO WORKS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, MASSIMO 
C. POGGIO, REBECCA JANE 
POGGIO and HOWARD R. FRANCIS: 
Defendants-
Case No: 18249 
Respondents. 
---0000000---
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant brought an action in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, to 
enforce +he terms of a Promissory Note. At trial defendant-re-
spondents prof erred evidence that the Promissory Note ~as superseded 
by a later Aareement dated November, 8, 1978. Defendants also 
counterclaimed for damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court found that the November 8 Agreement did, in 
fact, supersede the Promissory Note and dismissed ~ith prejudice 
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plaintiff-appellant's cause of action on that note. The court 
further found no cause of action on the defendant-respondent's 
counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks a re·versal of the trial court's 
judgment in order to enforce the Promissory Note and to avoid 
having to bring a new action on the November 8 Agreement. De-
fendant-respondents' seek, of course, an affirmance of the trial 
court's judgment. 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In defendant-respondents' view, the pertinent facts of this 
case are as follows: 
1. In 1976, the plaintiff-appellant, Richard w. Ringwood 
(hereinafter either "Ringwood" or "plaintiff-appellant") was then 
owner of 19,250 shares of a Utah corporation called Richard Ring-
wood, Inc. 
2. In 1976, one of the defendant-respondents Massimo Poggio, 
was a shareholder of the Utah corporation called Foreign Auto Works, 
Inc. (hereinafter "FAW"). Co-defendant-respondent, Howard 
Francis, was also a shareholder in Foreign Auto Works, Inc. 
3. In 1976, Richard Ringwood, Inc. and FAW merged. 
4. As a result of the merger, FAW became the sur-vi vor cor-
poration in which Richard w. Ringwood claimed 15,000 shares. 
-2-
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5. In 1978, Richard w. Ringwood and Massimo Poggio (here-
inafter "Poggio"), acting for FAW, entered into negotiations 
for the repurchase by FAW of Ringwood's 15,000 shares of stock. 
6. A ·verbal understanding was reached between these parties 
and memorialized by an interim Promissory Note signed near the 
end of October, 1978, but back dated to October 1, of that year. 
This document appears in the Record on Appeal as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1. 
7. Subsequent to the signing of this promissory note, the 
parties entered into a second agreement dated November 8, 1978 
(herein referred to as the "November 8 Agreement"). This document 
appears in the Record on Appeal as Defendants' Exhibit 22. 
8. The defendant-respondents introduced substantial and 
competent evidence at trial to show that the Promissory Note 
was an interim document that was superseded by the 
November 8 Agreement, which included most of the terms of the 
Promissory Note in addition to other terms relating to the total 
transaction between the parties. In this document, too, was in-
cluded explicit language rendering the Promissory Note nugatory. 
9. There was some ·vague testimony from Mr. Ringwood (see 
Trial Transcript, pp. 84-96) that he believed that the Promissory 
Note was part of the overall transaction. However, the 
defendant-respondents' version of the meaning of these documents 
(to-wit, that the No·vember 8 Agreement superseded the Promissory 
Note) was largely uncontroverted. 
-3-
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10. The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, found 
that the Promissory Note had, indeed, been superseded by the 
No·vember 8 Agreement and based its Findings of Fact on the 
language of the agreement itself (Defendants' EXhibit 22 at 
paragraph 16 and 21), as well of the language of Glen Ellis, 
the negotiating attorney for the defendant-respondents at that 
time, as found in his letter to Nick J. Colessides, attorney 
for plaintiff-appellant (Plaintiff's EXhibit 2). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AND 
DID NOT FAIL TO CONSTRUE All DOCUMENTS 
TOGETHER IN REACHING ITS DECISION. 
Plaintiff-appellant is correct when he states that the "general 
rule is that, absent fraud, an apparently complete agreement is 
presumed to contain the whole agreement." He is also correct 
when he states that such a "presumption should be made only when it 
[the written agreement] is integrated, when it is adopted by the 
parties as their final and complete e :xpression of agreement" (see 
Brief of Appellant, p. 3). The plaintiff-appellant is wrong, 
howe·ver, when he argues that the No·vember 8 Agreement is not 
integrated, does not represent the whole agreement between the 
parties, and does not supersede and render nugatory the Promissory 
Note of October 1, 1978. 
-4-
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A. The November 8 Agreement is integrated. 
The single e·vidence which plaintiff-appellant offers to 
support his contention that the November 8 Agreement is not 
integrated is Plaintiff's Exhibit 23, an Escrow Agreement. Plain-
tiff points to the fact that both the Promissory Note and the 
November 8 Aqreement were attached to this Escrow Agreement and 
asserts that fact as probative of the parties' intent that both 
attachments be construed together, particularly since, one 
payment to the plaintiff-appellant was made by the defendant-
respondents under the Promissory Note, e·ven before the November 
8 Agreement was executed. 
There are several reasons why this argument is without merit. 
There is nothing in the Escrow Agreement that explains why the 
Promissory Note and the No·vember 8 Agreement were attached or 
what the intention of the parties was with regard to their 
relationship to each other. The Escrow Agreement merely requires 
the defendant-respondents to make their payments according to 
the terms set forth in the Promissory Note, which were sub-
stanially the same as those set forth in the No·vember 8 
Agreement. What the Escrow Agreement does is incorporate by 
reference the terms of both attachments. Those terms speak 
for themselves. 
Under the terms of the November 8 Agreement, the Promissory 
Note was rendered nugatory as indicated by the language found 
-5-
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in paragraph 16 thereof. Which language the trial court relied 
upon in its Memorandum Decision. Paragraph 16 pro·vides: 
The parties herein have not made any representations, 
warranty, or covenant, not set forth herein and 
this agreement constitutes the entire agreement be-
tween the parties. All representations and warranties 
and agreement shall survive the date of this agree-
ment. 
If the last sentence of this paragraph is ambiguous, then that 
ambiguity was resol·ved by the trial court in favor of the de-
fendant-respondents in light of the further provisions of para-
graph 21 of the No·vember 8 Agreement, which provides as follows: 
Seller [Ringwood] as an additional consideration 
for this agreement, wai·ves any and all causes 
of action, rights or claims of any kind or nature 
against buyer corporation [FAW] or any of its 
shareholders, directors, or officers which accrued 
prior to the date hereof and agree to hold harm-
less from liability of any kind arising out of 
sellers acts while he was associated with the 
corporation. Seller further co·venants that he has 
not made any commitment, obligation, mortgage, 
a.ssi gnrnent or other conveyance of any corporate 
property, nor has he incured any obligation either 
against the corporation or its assets, nor has 
he obligated his 15,000 shares of corporate stock 
in any way. Seller agrees to defend against any 
claim set forth abo·ve and conveys his shares to 
the buyer, free and clear of any such adverse 
claim. 
These paragraphs, taken together, spell legal doom for the 
Promissory Note of October 1. This view is bolstered by the 
extrinsic evidence properly considered by the trial court and 
found in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 in the Record on Appeal. This 
document is a letter· from Glen Ellis (defendant-respondents' 
-6-
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attorney who conducted the negotiations leading to the No·wmber 
8 Agreement) to Nick J. Colessides, attorney for the plaintiff-
appellant. At paragraph 3 that document reads as follows: 
The third thing is that the agreement should hold 
general hold-harmless pro·visions, both ways and 
language indicating that this agreement is a 
settlement of a dispute and that it is a settlement 
in full of all claims by either party against the 
other. 
The court concluded that the No·vember 8 Agreement was, 
integrated, that it represented the whole Aareement between the 
parties, that it was adopted by the parties as the final and 
complete expression of that Agreement. See Restatement, Contracts, 
§228. 
Plaintiff-appellant contends that if the No·vember 8 Agreement 
was integrated, then the defendant-respondents would not have made 
payments pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note (see 
Defendants' Exhibit 17). The simple answer is that defendant-
respondents did not make payments under the Promissory Note. 
They made payments pursuant to the terms of the November 8 Agree-
ment. To this Massimo Poggio repeatedly testified at trial (see 
Trial Transcript, pp. 13~14, 26 and 27). The fact that the 
terms of both the interim Promissory Note and the integrated 
No·vember 8 Agreement are, in substance, identical supports the 
position of the defendant-rsspondents that they were making 
payments under the No·vember 8 Agreement as the complete and 
-7-
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final embodiment of their contract. 
If a difference exists between the Promissory Note and the 
November 8 Agreement, it lies in the language setting forth the 
remedies a·vailable to the seller, Richard W. Ringwood. Under the 
Promissory Note, the usual remedies in the e·vent of default are 
provided. In the November 8 Agreement, howe·ver, seller remedies 
in case of buyer default, provide that the money paid by 
seller "shall be deemed to have been paid, not as a penalty, 
but for an option to purchase stock which was not exercised, and 
the purchaser [FAW] shall have no claim whatsoever for such money 
or any part thereof, and further, seller [Ringwood] shall be 
free to pursue any other legal or equitable remedies a·vailable to 
the seller. 11 Thus, with regard to Ringwood' s remedies, the 
No·vember 8 Agreement supersedes and subsumes the remedies made 
a·vailable to him in the interim Promissory Note~ and furthermore, 
the November 8 Agreement adds the additional stock option lan-
guage to the tranasaction. All this is mentioned here to clarify 
that the defendant-respondents made their payments pursuant to 
the terms of the integrated Agreement of No·vember 8, which 
subsumed and superseded those of the Promissory Note. 
71h. •frttt.l f.!tJt:1t.-.C-
B. Since November 8 a eement was 
integrate did gi·ve effect to the parties 
intent by finding the promissory note had 
been superseded. 
Coi;·r-t:: 
Plaintiff-appellant argues that the trial erred by failing 
to construe all the pertinent documents together in arri·ving at 
its decision. 
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But this contention is untrue. The trial court had the 
documents before it and came to the conclusion that the Promi-
ssory Note had been invalidated. The court implied that it 
believed defendant-respondents' argument that the Promissory Note 
constituted a "interim" document calculated to maintain the 
status quo until the final and superseding agreement could be 
executed by the parties. 
In order to disturb this finding of fact, the plaintiff-
appellant cites a number of authorities all of which can be dis-
tinguished from the case at bar: 
1. Eie ·v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 
1981). This case involved an interim letter agreement between 
a hospital and some paramedics. Paramedical services were to 
be rendered and payment made therefor pursuant to this letter 
agreement until a final contract was executed. The final con-
tract ne·ver materialized. 
This case is cited by the plaintiff-appellant for the propo-
sition that "absent fraud, an apparently complete agreement is 
presumed to contain the whole agreement." This is true. But the 
case could also be cited for the proposition that whene·ver it is 
clear that an agreement is only an interim agreement, then the 
final agreement, if it exists, must be gi·ven effect as an 
integrated document. 
In the Eie case the interim agreement contained express lan-
guage contemplating a later agreement that was never forthcoming. 
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Therefore, the court declared that this interim agreement was not 
integrated and gave effect to the parties' intent as established 
at trial by extrinsic evidence. 
However, in the case at bar, the interim Promissory Note was 
actually followed by the November 8 Agreement, containing 
language rendering the Promissory Note nugatory. This presents 
an entirely different fact situation from that in the Eie case. 
Here the parties ha-ve, not an interim agreement, but a final, 
integrated one, which, unlike the situtation in Eie, must be 
interpreted without resort to extrinsic evidence. 
2. Bullfrog Marina, Inc. ·v. Lentz, 28 Ut. 2d 261, 501, 
P.2d 266 (1973). In this case, the lower court found, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed, that a lease for houseboats and an 
accompanying employment agreement constituted an integrated agree-
ment because the "defendant would not ha·ve leased the housebouts 
to plaintiff unless he could operate the houseboat rental ser-
vices." Id. at 270. In other words, the lease and the employ-
ment agreement co·vered different aspects of a single transaction 
between the same parties. 
This is not like the facts in the present case. The No·vember 
8 Agreement does not cover a different aspect of the same transaction 
set forth in the Promissory Note. On the contrary, the November 8 
Agreement substantially includes, and adds to the terms of the 
Note. In the Bullfrog case, both the lease and the employment 
-10-
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contract were necessary to frame the whole intended transaction 
of the parties. But in this case, the whole transaction is set 
forth in the one, final, and integrated agreement. 
3. Strike ·v. White, 91 Utah 170, 63 P.2d 600 (1936). In 
this case, a buyer purchased an amusement park under a contract 
which provided that the seller would pay "all obligations and 
liabilities of e·very kind and nature that were outstanding against 
the music company and the Star Theatre at the time the contract 
was executed. 11 Id. at 602. At the time of the sale, the amuse-
ment park owed the electric company $508.00; this amount was for 
future services. At trial the seller introduced a bill of sale 
that contained terms at variance with the sales contract; it 
stated that the purchaser would "assume to pay all future rentals 
for services in connection with the sound equipment contract" with 
the electric company. Id. at 601. The bill of sale was not 
signed by the purchaser. The Supreme Court held that the original 
sales contract was integrated and that the subsequent bill of 
sale could not be construed together to alter the terms of 
the sales contract without the introduction of parol evidence 
in violation of the parol evidence rule. 
Apparently, plaintiff-appellant cites this case for the 
proposition that "another well-established rule of law is that 
where two or more instruments are executed as part of one transaction, 
such instruments should·, when possible, be construed together" 
-11-
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(see Brief of Appellant, p. 5). But defendant-respondents do not 
contest this rule of law. They contest only its application to 
the circumstances of the case at bar where there do not exist two 
contracts comprising one transaction, but where there is one 
transaction e·videnced by the single integrated agreement, Fur-
thermore, in Strike, the two documents were at variance and the 
court refused to give credence to the bill of sale because it 
had not been signed by both parties. In the present case, the 
two documents in question are not at variance (the November 8 
Agreement contains all the substantial pro-visions of the Pro-
missory Note and more) and, furthermore, both documents are signed. 
The two cases are inapposite. 
4. Peck & Sons, Inc. ·v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d. 
187, 515 P.2d 446 (1973). In this case, the Lee Products proposed 
a lease to Peck & Sons. The lease was unacceptable, so the 
parties negotiated and finally agreed to an "added option. 11 Later, 
Lee contended that the lease was a separate transaction to be 
·viewed independently of the terms of the 11 added option. 11 Peck 
argued that the two documents constituted a single integrated 
contract to be ·viewed together by the court. The court held that 
the documents were to be construed together. 
The plaintiff-appellant cites this case for the proposition 
that "the meaning and effect to be gi·ven a contract depends upon 
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the intent of the parties; and that this is to be ascertained 
by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts in their 
relationship to each other .... 11 (Brief of Appellant, p. 5). 
But the Peck case bears only a superficial resemblance to the 
case at bar. The argument in both cases is o·ver two documents 
and whether they should be construed together or whether one 
should be found to be integrated and to express the complete and 
final agreement between the parties without reference to the other. 
But here the similarity between the Peck case and the present 
case ends. For in Peck the lease and the "added option" set 
forth different terms that had to be construed together to make 
commercial sense. But in the case at bar, the No·vember 8 Agree-
ment embodies the Promissory Note's terms and makes commercial 
sense on its own. Plaintiff-appellant could have sued under the 
November 8 Agreement, but instead, inad·vertently sued under the 
invalid Promissory Note which no longer had legal effect. 
5. Driggs ·v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 
417, 142 P.2d 657 (1943). This case is cited by plaintiff-
appellant for the proposition that contracts should be construed 
so as to make sense. With this proposition the defendant-re-
spondents have no argument. 
6. Maw ·v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 440, 354 P.2d 121 (1960). This 
case is cited by the plaintiff-appellant for the proposition 
that any uncertainty in a contract must be resolved in light of 
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the parties' intent. 
proposition either. 
Defendant-respondents do not contest this 
What they do contest are plaintiff-appellant's 
factual assertions, made on appeal, which were rejected by the 
trial court on the basis of substantial competent e·vidence, 
supporting the defendant-respondents position. 
None of the cases cited by the plaintiff-appellant provide 
any authority whatsoever for his contention that the trial court's 
findings should be disturbed on appeal. {See Point III, infra); 
Nor do these ca~es support his contention that, under the cir-
cumstances of this case and the evidence in the record, the 
November 8 Agreement can not, either in law or fact, be found 
to be an integrated agreement, superseding the Promissory 
Note of October 1. 
Howe·ver, there is ample law in this jurisdiction to support 
the defendant-respondents' proposition that the parties could 
enter into an interim Promissory Note and then, finalizing their 
negotiations, wai·ve the Promissory Note, and enter into a final 
integrated agreement. See PLC Landscape Construction ·v. Piccadilly 
Fish N Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562 (1972); Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963); Dillman v. Massey 
Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962); Prince ·v. 
R.C. Tolman Construction Co., Inc., 610 P.2d 1267 (Utah 1980). 
And it has been generally held that where parties engage in 
negotiations concerning a transaction, pursuant to which they 
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enter into a written contract, it is presumed that all matters 
relating to the subject matter of their agreement are merged 
in and constituted a complete integration of their agreement. 
National Sur. Corp. ·v. Christiansen Bros., Inc., 29 Utah 2d. 460, 
511, P.2d. 731 (1973): see also Rapp v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 
Co., 606 P.2d 1189 (Utah 1980). 
Therefore, in arriving at its decision, the trial court relied 
both upon substantial evidence and sound legal principles. 
POINT II 
THE NOVEMBER 8 AGREEMENT IS A NOVATION 
Plaintiff-appellant cites the case of Cooke v. McAdoo, 85 
N.J.L. 692, 90 A. 302 (1914) for the proposition that "a novation 
is a substituted contract and implies the elimination of an 
existing debt or obligation and its transition into a new one 
between the same or other parties" (see Brief of Appellant, p. 6). 
Plaintiff-appellant concludes that pursuant to this rule, the 
No·vember 8 Agreement was not a no·vation of a Promissory Note of 
October 1. 
Defendant-respondents vigorously disagree with this con-
clusion. The No·vember 8 Agreement was clearly a substitution 
of the promissory note: and, equally clearly, it extinguished the 
existing debt, e·videnced by the interim note, and created a 
transition to a new debt (on substantially the same terms) 
between the same parties. A novation could not be clearer 
from the facts or more soundly based in law. 
-15-
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For example, in Nelson v. Newman, 538 P.2d 601( Utah 1978) 
the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court 1 s finding of no-vation, 
where a series of 57 promissory notes (representing monthly 
installments due and owing) extinguished the parties rights 
under a previous contract. 
In Nicholson v. Hardwick, 49 Or.App. 169, 619 P.2d 925 (1980), 
the Oregon Supreme Court held that "when parties to a contract 
execute a subsequent agreement respecting the same matter and 
the second contract is inconsistent in some of its terms with the 
first, the second agreement is deemed to ha-ve superseded the prior 
contract [citations omitted]." This is like the case at bar, where 
the language of paragraphs 16 and 21 of the November 8 Agreement 
are inconsistent with the rights of the parties under the Promissory 
Note. 
Winkleman ·v. Oregon-Washington Plywood Co., 240 Ore. 1, 399 P.2d I 
402 (1965) is a case where a vendor and a purchaser entered into 
a second contract which provided for the cancellation of a prior 
agreement and for a certain sum, previously paid, to be applied 
in settlement of damages under the prior agreement. The Oregon 
Supreme Court held that it was the intent of the parties to 
terminate completely their rights under the first contract upon 
signing of the second, and a second contract was a substituted 
contract which replaced the first one. 
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In Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977), the 
parties entered into an Earnest Money Aareement and Off er to 
Purchase and then, that transaction having failed for lack of 
financing, they entered into a second such agreement. The Supreme 
Court held that: 
"it appears perfectly logical and reasonable for 
the trial court to determine that since the initial 
contract had failed to produce the mutual desired 
result that a new approach, through a different 
contractual arrangement, was agreed upon and in 
turn substituted for and became integrated there-
with." Id. at 753 
These four cases, Nelson, Nicholson, Winkleman, and Hano·ver, 
all support defendant-respondents' contention that a novation 
occurred. 
Plaintiff-appellant cites. Elliot v. Whitney, 215 Kan. 256, 
524 P.2d 704 (1974) for the proposition that in order for there 
to be a novation, the Hnew contract must be so radically different 
from the old that it necessarily supersedes the old" (See Brief 
of Appellant, pp. 6 and 7). But this is not what the Elliot case 
holds. The Kansas Supreme Court, in Elliot, was addressing itself 
not to the issue of no-va.tion, but to the issue of intention to 
create a novation: How does a finder of fact determine if a 
. rw 
novation was intended by the parties when there exists ._, explicit 
language to that effect? The Elliot court cited "C .J. S., No·va.tion, 
paragraph llb (1), pp. 692-93: 
While . . the intention to accomplish a novation 
need not be by express agreement to that effect, but 
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may be inferred, like any other contract, from the 
facts, circumstances, and conduct of the parties, 
in order for a subsequent contract to constitute 
a novation and discharge of a prior one by implied 
intention of the parties, ordinarily it must appear 
that the new contract is so radically different 
from the old one that it necessarily supersedes it 
as an entirety. 
In other words, in a situation where there is no explicit lan-
auage and one must find a novation from the acts of the parties 
under those circumstances, "ordinarily it must appear that 
the new contract is so radically different from the old one 
that it necessarily supersedes it as an entiretye" Having 
said as much, the Elliot court went on to find that a no·vation 
existed between the parties in that case because the new 
contract contained the following explicit language: 
Each of the parties hereby releases and obsol·ves 
the other from any and all liability arising out 
of any business association or agreement hereto-
fore made between the parties. Id. at 704. 
The Elliot court concluded that, "the plain and ordinary meanin 
of the term 'hereby' as used abo·ve can only be 'by or through t 
document' or 'by means of this document' 
. the intent e ~ 
pressed therein must discharge all prior obligations upon execu 
of the written agreement .... " Id. at 704. 
In the present case, the No·vember 8 Agreement contained 
similar language at paragraphs 16 and 21. This language, in th 
words of the Elliot court, "clearly evidenced the parties inten 
thereby to settle and adjust all disputes existing between them 
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and it must be upheld." Id. at 704. 
This conclusion applies equally well to the case at bar 
where, as e·vidence by paragraph 3 of the Plaintiff 1 s Exhibit 2 
in the Record on Appeal, the parties intended that the No·vember 
8 Agreement be a settlement of all previous disputes and a dis-
charge of all previous obligations. See Robinson v. Hansen, 594 
P.2d 867 (Utah 1979); and United Security Corp. v. Anderson 
Aviation Sales Co., 23 Ariz.App. 273, 532 P.2d. 545 (1975). 
The language of the No·vember 8 Aareement, itself, and the 
other evidence relied upon by the trial court supports the finding 
that the No·vember 8 Agreement was to be a novation of the 
Promissory Note of October 1, completely replacing that Note as 
the underlying legal basis for the transaction between the parties. 
All the elements of novation have been met: There was (1) previous 
valid agreement in the form of a Promissory Note, (2) a subsequent 
valid "new" Agreement involving all the parties to the old one, 
and (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation under the Promissory 
Note. See Food Health Co., Inc. ·v. 3839 Joint Venture, 129 Ariz. 
103, 628 P.2d 986 (1981). 
There is no basis, then, 
er--in the facts of this case ~ in 
the law of novation for the disturbing of the trial court's finding 
that the No·vember 8 Agreement superseded and replaced the Promissory 
Note. 
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POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE 
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The question of whether or not a written contract is in-
tegrated is a question for the trier of fact. Youngren ·v. John 
w. Lloyd Constr. Co., 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969). 
This court has held that the Supreme Court cannot reverse 
a trial court on appeal on the facts of· a law case, but can 
only reverse if there be an error of law. Brigham v. Moon Lake 
Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d. 393 (1970). 
The question of whether or not a trial court based its 
finding of fact on a sufficiency of evidence is a question of law 
for the Supreme Court to determine. Coronado Mining Corp. -v. 
Marathon Oil Co., 577 P.2d. 957 (Utah 1978). 
Clearly, this is not a suit in equity in which the Supreme 
Court can make its own fact findings. Hatch v. Bastian, 567 P.2d 
1100 (Utah 1977); though, even in such equity cases, the Supreme 
Court defers to the trial court in fact findings. See Corbet v. 
Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970); Brady v. Fausett, 
546 P.2d 246 (Utah 1976); Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452 
(Utah 1975); Nelson v. Nelson, 513 P.2d 1011 (Utah 1973); 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 449 P.2d. 989 (Utah 1969); 
Stone v. Stone, 431 P.2d 809 (Utah 1967); Build, Inc. v. Italason, 
398 P.2d 544 (Utah 1965). 
In making a determination as to the sufficiency of evidence 
underlying a trial court's findings of fact in the law case, the 
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Supreme Court will accord considerable difference to the judge-
ment of the trial court due to its advantage position and will 
not disturb the action of the trial court unless the evidence 
clearly purponderates to the contrary or the trial court abuses 
its discretion or misapplies principals of law. Ute-Cal Land 
Development v. Intermountain Stock Exchange, 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1981). 
Moreover, in a situation where a trial judge, sitting as 
a trier of fact, makes a specific finding of fact on apparently 
conflicting or actually conflicting evidence, the Appellate Court 
should concern itself only with the evidence that supports the 
trial court's findings and not the evidence that might have 
supported contrary findings. See Matter of Philips Estate, 
4 Kan.App.2d 256, 604 P.2d 747 (1980); See also In Re Marriage of 
Morrison, 26 Wash.App. 571, 613 P.2d 557 (1980). 
In this case the Supreme Court should accord to the trial 
court considerable difference and review only that evidence 
which supports the trial court's finding (i.e. Defendants' 
Exhibit 22, especially paragraphs 16 and 21 therein, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 paragraph 3). 
In fact, the court should only disturb the trial court's 
finding in this case if the evidence to the contrary is so clear 
and persuasive that all reasonable minds would find the other way. 
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Hall v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977); Centurian Corp. v. 
Fiberchem, Inc., 562 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1977); DeBry & Hilton Travel 
Services, Inc. v. Capitol Intern. Airways, Inc., 555 P.2d 874 
(Utah, 1976); Nuhn v. Broadbent, 29 Utah 2d 198, 507 P.2d. 371 
(1973); Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 503 P.2d 139 (1973); 
Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal Co., 23 Utah 2d 86, 458 P.2d 625 (1973). 
If the Supreme Court finds on review, that the findings and 
judgment of the lower court are sustained by any substantial 
evidence and reasonable inferenc~drawn therefrom, the trial 
court's finding will be affirmed. Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154 
514 P.2d 1142 (1973); Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 
2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973); Movie Films, Inc. v. First Sec. 
Bank of Utah, N.A., 22 Utah 2d 1, 447 P.2d 38 (1968); Hanley v. 
Hales, 17 Utah 2d 344, 411 P.2d 836 (1966). 
Thus the burden on plaintiff-appellant is very heavy. For 
him to prevail, he must show that, on review of the record, all 
minds would construe the evidence therein contrary to the finding 
of the trial court -- a burden that plaintiff-appellant cannot 
possibly meet in light of Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 and De-
fendants' Exhibit 22 herein. However, the burden on the defendant-
respondents is very light. For if there is any substantial com-
petent evidence to support the trial court's finding, those findings 
must not be disturbed. See Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 538 P.2d 298 (1975}; Wash-a-Matic, 
Inc. v. Rupp, 532 P.2d 682 (1975}; First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. 
v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 24, 504 P.2d 995 (1972}; Elton v. Utah State Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Retirement Bd., 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972); Robertson v. 
Hutchinson, 560 P.2d 1110 (1977); Martin v. Martin, 29 Utah 2d 
413, 510 P.2d 1102 (1973); Phillips Mfg. Co. v. Putman, 29 Utah 2d 
69, 504 P.2d 1376 (1973); Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d, 370, 
510 P.2d 526 (1973); Nance v. City of Provo, 29 Utah 2d 340, 
509 P.2d 365 (1973); Parker v. Telegift Intern, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 
87, 505 P.2d 301 (1973); Branch v. Western Factors, Inc., 28 Utah 
2d 361, 502 P.2d 570 (1972); Schlueter v. Summit County, Town of 
Karnas, 25 Utah 2d 257, 480 P.2d 140 {1971); Lynch v. McDonald, 12 
Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d 464 (1962). 
This is true even in a case where the interpretation of the 
parties agreement becomes a question of fact. International 
Engineering Co., Inc. v. Daum Industries, Inc., 102 Idaho 363, 
630 P.2d 155 (1981); Supra-valu Stores, Inc. v. Loveless, 5 
Wash.App. 551, 489 P.2d 368 (1971);- Coldiron v. McKenzie, 260 Or. 
237, 490 P.2d 976 (1971); Coonrod & Waly Const. Co., Inc. v. Motel 
Enterprises, Inc., 217 Kan. 63, 535 P.2d 971 (1975); Glenn Dick 
Equipment Co. v. Galey Const. Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 
(1975); Fundingsland v. Schmidt, 493 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1971). 
And it is particularly true, as in this case, where the 
trial court predicated its findings on documentary evidence. 
Haywood v. Gill, 400 P.2d 16, 16 Utah 2d 299 {1965). 
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In situations where the evidence is contradictory, the trial 
court's findings will not be disturbed even in a contracts case. 
Staples Excavation & Erection Co. v. Weyher Constr. Co., 26 Utah 2d 
387, 490 P.2d 330 (1971); Harrop v. Harward, 565 P.2d 70 (Utah 1977); 
DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290, cert. denied, 371 
u.s. 821, 83 s.ct. 37, 9 L.ed. 2d 61. 
CONCLUSION 
The record on appeal supports the defendant-respondents' 
position that the trial court's findings that the fact conclusions 
of law, to-wit: that the November 8 Agreement was integrated, that 
it was superceded by the Promissory Note, and that the plaintiff-
appellant had no cause of action on said note. Furthermore, the 
law of this jurisdiction, as overwhelmingly demonstrated in 
this brief, amply sustains the defendant-respondents' argument 
that this court, in light of the substantial, competent evidence 
upon which the finder of fact based his findings, conclusions 
and decision, should affirm the judgment of the lower court. 
DATED this / 7 17.. day of August, 1982. 
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